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Abstract
The evolution of altruism is a fundamental and enduring puzzle in biology. In a seminal paper Hamilton showed that
altruism can be selected for when rb 2 c.0, where c is the fitness cost to the altruist, b is the fitness benefit to the
beneficiary, and r is their genetic relatedness. While many studies have provided qualitative support for Hamilton’s rule,
quantitative tests have not yet been possible due to the difficulty of quantifying the costs and benefits of helping acts. Here
we use a simulated system of foraging robots to experimentally manipulate the costs and benefits of helping and
determine the conditions under which altruism evolves. By conducting experimental evolution over hundreds of
generations of selection in populations with different c/b ratios, we show that Hamilton’s rule always accurately predicts the
minimum relatedness necessary for altruism to evolve. This high accuracy is remarkable given the presence of pleiotropic
and epistatic effects as well as mutations with strong effects on behavior and fitness (effects not directly taken into account
in Hamilton’s original 1964 rule). In addition to providing the first quantitative test of Hamilton’s rule in a system with a
complex mapping between genotype and phenotype, these experiments demonstrate the wide applicability of kin
selection theory.
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Introduction
One of the enduring puzzles in biology and the social sciences is
the origin and persistence of altruism, whereby a behavior
benefiting another individual incurs a direct cost for the individual
performing the altruistic action. A solution to this apparent
paradox was first provided by Hamilton [1], who showed that a
behavior increases in frequency when rb 2 c.0, where c is the
fitness cost to the altruist, b is the fitness benefit to the beneficiary,
and r is their genetic relatedness. While this rule has provided an
important framework in which to conceptualize social evolution
[2–12], it is based on several assumptions, including weak
selection, additivity of costs and benefits of fitness components,
and a special definition of relatedness that uses statistical
correlations among individuals rather than genealogy to describe
similarity. Several studies investigated how violations to these
assumptions may lead to failures of Hamilton’s original 1964 rule
[13–21], but it is yet unclear how the combined effects of these
factors may affect the evolution of altruism in organisms with a
complex mapping between genotype and phenotype. It also
remains to be investigated to what extent Hamilton’s original 1964
rule is influenced by factors such as drift and interactions between
loci within genomes [22,23].
To investigate how a complex mapping between genotype and
phenotype can affect the course of social evolution, we conducted
artificial evolution with groups of robots in simulations by
modifying a system recently developed to investigate the evolution
of cooperative transport [24]. Eight small (26264 cm) Alice
robots [25] and eight food items were placed in a foraging arena
with one white wall and three black walls. The performance of
robots was proportional to the number of food items successfully
transported to the white wall and the robots were given the option
to allocate the fitness rewards of successfully transported items to
themselves (selfish behavior) or share them with other group
members (altruistic behavior—in this case the fitness reward of the
food item was shared equally between the seven other robots in the
group). By choosing appropriate fitness values for shared and non-
shared food items (see Materials and Methods), it was possible to
precisely manipulate the benefits and cost of helping behavior (i.e.,
the c and b values of Hamilton’s rule, see Materials and Methods).
The robots were equipped with two motorized wheels and three
infrared distance sensors that could detect food items up to 3 cm
away, a fourth infrared distance sensor with 6 cm range allowing
to distinguish food items from robots, and two vision sensors
mounted on top of the robot to perceive the color of the arena
walls (Figure 1A). These six sensors were connected to a neural
network comprising six input neurons, three hidden neurons, and
three output neurons (Figure 1B). Two output neurons determined
the speeds of the wheels, while the third neuron determined
whether the food items successfully collected were shared or not.
The genome of the robots (33 genes) encoded the 33 connection
weights of the neural network (see Materials and Methods) and
thus determined how sensory information was processed and how
robots behaved. Our analyses reveal that this system resulted in
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of mutations having strong effects on behavioral traits (i.e., leading
to deviations from the assumption of weak selection).
Results
We conducted 500 generations of selection in a population
consisting of 200 groups. The probability of robots to transmit
their genomes from one generation to the next was proportional to
their individual fitness (see Materials and Methods). The selected
genomes were randomly assorted and subjected to crossovers and
mutations to create the 1,600 new genomes (200 groups of 8
robots) forming the next generation [24].
This experimental setup allowed us to independently manipu-
late the relatedness between robots within a group and the cost-to-
benefit ratios of helping. To quantitatively test Hamilton’s rule for
the evolution of altruism, we investigated how the level of altruism
(defined as the proportion of food items shared with other group
members) changed over generations in populations with five
different c/b ratios and five relatedness values (see Materials and
Methods). For each of these 25 treatments, the selection
experiments were conducted in 20 independently evolving
populations. Because of the impossibility to conduct hundreds of
generations of selection with real robots, we used physics-based
simulations that precisely model the dynamical and physical
properties of the robots. We previously showed that evolved
genomes can be successfully implemented in real robots [26] that
display similar behavior to that observed in the simulations.
Because the 33 genes were initially set to random values, the
robots’ behaviors were completely arbitrary in the first generation.
However, the robots’ performance rapidly increased over the 500
generations of selection (Figure 2). The level of altruism also
rapidly changed over generations with the final stable level of
altruism varying greatly depending on the within-group related-
ness and c/b ratio (Figure 3). When the c/b value was very small
(0.01), the level of altruism was very high in the populations where
within-group relatedness was positive (i.e., 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and
1.00) and close to zero when robots were unrelated (Figure 4). In
the treatments with other c/b values, the level of altruism was also
very low when the relatedness was close to 0 and the level of
altruism also rapidly increased when the relatedness became
higher than a given value. In all cases, the transition occurred
when r became greater than c/b, as predicted by Hamilton’s rule.
When the relatedness was equal to c/b, there was an
intermediate level of altruism with the frequency of altruistic acts
not differing significantly from the initial value, which was 0.5
(four one-sample Wilcoxon tests, df=19, all p.0.368). This is the
expected pattern because the inclusive fitness of robots, comprising
both their own fitness points and those gained from altruists, is
independent of whether or not they behave altruistically when r=
c/b. Under such conditions, the level of altruism should vary only
as a result of drift over generations, thus leading to important
between-population variation in the level of altruism. Consistent
Figure 1. Physical robots and neural network controller. (A) The Alice robots used in the experiments were equipped with infrared distance
sensors (IR) and vision sensors (camera). (B) The input neurons (small circles) of the artificial neural network were connected to internal and output
neurons (large circles) by 33 connection weights (lines connecting circles).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1000615.g001
Author Summary
One of the enduring puzzles in biology and the social
sciences is the origin and persistence of altruism, whereby
a behavior benefiting another individual incurs a direct
cost for the individual performing the altruistic action. This
apparent paradox was resolved by Hamilton’s theory,
known as kin selection, which states that individuals can
transmit copies of their own genes not only directly
through their own reproduction but also indirectly by
favoring the reproduction of kin, such as siblings or
cousins. While many studies have provided qualitative
support for kin selection theory, quantitative tests have
not yet been possible due to the difficulty of quantifying
the costs and benefits of helping acts. In this study, we
conduct simulations with the help of a simulated system of
foraging robots to manipulate the costs and benefits of
altruism and determine the conditions under which
altruism evolves. By conducting experimental evolution
over hundreds of generations of selection in populations
with different costs and benefits of altruistic behavior, we
show that kin selection theory always accurately predicts
the minimum relatedness necessary for altruism to evolve.
This high accuracy is remarkable given the presence of
pleiotropic and epistatic effects, as well as mutations with
strong effects on behavior and fitness. In addition to
providing a quantitative test of kin selection theory in a
system with a complex mapping between genotype and
phenotype, this study reveals that a fundamental principle
of natural selection also applies to synthetic organisms
when these have heritable properties.
A Quantitative Test of Hamilton’s Rule
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altruism when r was equal to c/b (F=0.204) was significantly
higher than when r was greater than c/b (F=0.018; Mann-
Whitney, df=13, p=0.002) and when r was smaller than c/b
(F=0.015; Mann-Whitney, df=13, p,0.003).
The fact that the level of altruism remained slightly greater than
0 when r was smaller than c/b and slightly lower than 1 when r was
greater than c/b can be explained by mutations maintaining some
behavioral variability in the population. In line with this view of
the level of altruism being at mutation-selection equilibrium, the
level of altruism became significantly closer to zero (Pearson’s
r=0.643; Mann-Whitney, df=13, p,0.001) as the strength of
selection increased (i.e., when the value r 2 c/b became more
negative, only negative values of r 2 c/b considered for the
correlation). Similarly, the level of altruism became significantly
closer to 1 (Pearson’s r=0.805; Mann-Whitney, df=13, p,0.004)
as the strength of selection for higher levels of altruism increased
(i.e., when the value r 2 c/b increased, only positive values of r 2
c/b considered in the correlation).
To determine whether mutations in our neural network had
pleiotropic and epistatic effects and whether there were departures
from weak mutations effects, we conducted additional experiments
at the last generation in two treatments with intermediate r and c/b
values (treatment 1: r=0.25, c/b=0.75; treatment 2: r=0.75, c/
b=0.25). First, for each treatment, we subjected 4,000 individuals
(one in each group) to a single mutation of moderate effect (see
Materials and Methods). In the first experiment, performance was
significantly affected by a much higher proportion of the
mutations than the level of altruism (Table 1). Importantly,
1.36% of the mutations affecting the level of altruism also
translated into a significant change in performance, indicating
widespread pleiotropic effects. Similar results were obtained in the
second experiment with 4.91% of the mutations affecting the level
of altruism also significantly affecting performance. Second, we
tested for epistatic effects by comparing the effect of a single
mutation in 4,000 individuals with two allelic variants at another
locus (see Materials and Methods). The genetic background
significantly influenced the effect of the mutation in 2,371 (59.3%)
of the cases in the first treatment and 2,336 (58.4%) of the cases in
the second treatment. These results demonstrate that epistatic
interactions are also widespread. Finally, our experiments showed
frequent departures from weak effects on behavior and fitness.
Performance changed by more than 25% for 1,616 (40.4%) of the
mutations in the first treatment and 1,776 (44.4%) of the
mutations in the second treatment, and the level of altruism
changed by more than 25% for 552 (13.8%) and 1,808 (45.2%) of
the mutations in the first and second treatment, respectively.
Discussion
Although Hamilton’s original 1964 rule provides a general
framework of how natural selection works [17,27], its theoretical
and empirical applications usually involve the limiting assumptions
of weak selection and additivity of costs and benefits of fitness
components as well as the absence of pleiotropic and epistatic gene
interactions [15,16,28] (but see [13] for relaxations of some of these
assumptions in concrete applications), leading to the conclusion that
the rb 2 c.0 rule should be used with caution when there are
pleiotropic, epistatic, and non-additive effects [29,30]. Interestingly,
the genetic architecture of the robots in our system also led to
departure from all these assumptions with the exception of non-
additivity of costs and benefits of fitness components. However, the
occurrence of non-additive (epistatic) effects of mutations at several
loci in the genome leads to a situation that is conceptually similar to
non-additivity of costs and benefits of fitness components [22]. In
both cases, the fitness depends non-additively on gene action, with
the interaction involving alleles at two loci on the same genome in
the case of non-additive (epistatic) gene effects, and alleles at two
homologous loci on two different genomes in the case of non-
additivity of costs and benefits of fitness components.
Despite the fact that the assumptions mentioned above were not
fulfilled, Hamilton’s original 1964 rule always accurately predicted
the conditions under which altruism evolved in our system.
Whatever the c/b value used, altruism always evolved in
populations where r was greater than c/b. This finding is important
given that the assumption of weak selection, additivity of costs and
benefits of fitness components and absence of pleiotropic and
epistatic gene interactions are also likely to be violated in real
Figure 2. Mean group foraging efficiency during the 500
generations of selection. Lines represent the mean number of items
transported successfully for each of the 25 treatments (five relatedness
values6five c/b ratios, 20 replicates per treatment), with yellow dashed
lines representing treatments where r = c/b, red lines treatments where
r , c/b, and blue dotted lines treatments where r . c/b.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1000615.g002
Figure 3. Mean level of altruism during the 500 generations of
selection. Lines represent the mean level of altruism, defined as the
proportion of food items shared with other group members, for each of
the 25 treatments (five relatedness values6five c/b ratios, 20 replicates
per treatment), with yellow dashed lines representing treatments where
r = c/b, red lines treatments where r , c/b, and blue dotted lines
treatments where r . c/b.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1000615.g003
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and phenotypes.
Another important issue relates to the measure of relatedness.
There has been considerable confusion in the literature since
relatedness coefficients actually measure more than pedigree
coefficients and because different derivations of Hamilton’s rule
take as their focal trait a variety of different quantities [16,17,30]. In
the original derivation of Hamilton’s rule [1] and many that
followed (e.g., [12,31]), the trait of interest was the genetic value at a
single gene position and the regression coefficient of relatedness
corresponded to an identity in state relative to the population
average [31]. The interest in social evolution where social partners
tend to be genealogical kin [1] has led to the use of Wright’s F
statistics as a measure of relatedness (e.g. [12,22,32]). Alternatively,
Hamilton’s rule has been derived to express the change in the social
behavior phenotype (e.g., [16,22,33,34]), often considered as a
quantitative trait with many underlying gene positions contributing.
In this case the coefficient of relatedness represents a regression of
some measureofthe individual’sgeneticvalue forthat traitsuchasa
breeding value [17], p score [16], gene frequency [1,12], or partner
phenotype on its own phenotype value [34].
Interestingly, the simple genetic structure of our groups leads to
all these measures of relatedness being identical. In all our
Figure 4. Mean level of altruism at the end of the 500 generations of selection. The mean (6SD) level of altruism as a function of the c/b
ratio and level of relatedness (20 replicates per treatment) for r = c/b (yellow lines), r , c/b (red lines), and r . c/b (blue lines). Dashed lines are fits
based on a model by McNamara et al. [44–46].
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1000615.g004
Table 1. Effects of a single mutation on performance,
altruism, and both.
Treatment Performance Altruism Both
r=0.25, c/b=0.75 2,524 86 54
r=0.75, c/b=0.25 376 243 189
Number of individuals for whom a single mutation of moderate effect
significantly altered only performance, only the level of altruism, and both
performance and the level of altruism (i.e., pleiotropic effects). Experiments
were performed on 4,000 individuals in the two treatments with intermediate r
and c/b values (see Materials and Methods).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1000615.t001
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from the previous generations. The relatedness between these
founding individuals is therefore zero as they are not more
genetically or phenotypically similar within groups than between
groups. Positive within-group relatedness was created by cloning
the founding individuals. Thus, positive relatedness was only due
to one-generation coancestry and the probability that benefits of
altruism being provided to a clone compared to an unrelated
individual. Such a breeding system is conceptually very similar to
that Hamilton had in mind when trying to explain the evolution of
reproductive altruism in social insects where the sterile (altruistic)
workers are the offspring of their mother queen (the individual
benefitting from the altruistic worker behavior). The relatedness in
such a system can also be described in terms of identity by descent
[35], which provides an approximation of identity in state for rare
genetic variants (see [31] for a recent review). Of interest would be
to test in future studies how the evolution of altruism is influenced
by more complex population structures where the effect of strong
selection may lead to variation in within-genome differences in the
covariance between genes in different individuals.
Because the rewards provided by the food items were either
assigned to the focal individual who successfully transported it
(selfish behavior) or shared equally between all the other group
members (altruistic behavior), the fitness effects were additive and
there were no synergetic effects. Thus, the cost incurred by an
individual sharing altruistically a food item and the benefits to the
other group members was not dependent on the recipients’
genotypes and the proportion of them being altruistic. The lack of
such synergetic effects results in the costs and benefits associated
with an altruistic act being independent of the genotypic
composition of the groups and the overall level of altruism in
the population (i.e., there are no frequency-dependent effects). In
natural systems there are frequently synergetic effects and this is
one of the main reasons why it is not possible to reliably quantify
the cost and benefits associated with altruistic actions (e.g.,
[15,16,36,37]).
From an empirical perspective, our study is therefore valuable
because there have been many tests of Hamilton’s rule, but these
studies are usually not quantitative due to the impossibility of
assessing the costs and benefits of altruistic acts, even in the most
simple social systems such as those documented in some bacteria
[10,38], social amoebae [39], or even synthetic microbial systems
[36]. Our study also demonstrates that contrary to some
misunderstandings [3], kin selection does not require specific
genes devoted to encode altruism or sophisticated cognitive
abilities, as the neuronal network of our robots comprised only
33 neurons. More generally, this study reveals that a fundamental
principle of natural selection also applies to synthetic organisms
when these have heritable properties [40].
Materials and Methods
Experimental Setup, Robots, and Neural Architecture
Groups of eight Alice micro-robots and eight food items were
placed into a 50650 cm foraging arena. We chose a collective
foraging task to investigate the evolution of altruism, because
foraging efficiency is a key factor for many biological social groups
such as ant or bee colonies [41]. Foraging required robots to locate
a food item, to position themselves in front of the item, and to push
it into a 4-cm-wide target zone along the white wall of the arena
(the three other walls were black).
Robots were controlled by a feed-forward neural network
consisting of six sensory input neurons, one bias input neuron, and
six neurons with sigmoid activation. The robots had four infrared
distance sensors, three of them sensing objects within a 3 cm range
and the fourth, which was placed higher, having a 6 cm range.
These sensors allowed robots to locate the food items and
distinguish them from robots. Robots were also equipped with two
vision sensors to see the white wall [24].
These six sensory inputs were scaled to a range of [21; 1]. In
addition to the sensory inputs the neural network also comprised a
bias input set to a constant value of 21, which was used to encode
the neuron firing threshold. These seven inputs were connected to
three neurons in a hidden layer, which in turn connected to three
output neurons. The strength of these 33 connections was
determined by 33 genes, whose values ranged from 0 to 255
(i.e., 8 bit resolution per gene). The activation of each of the six
hidden and three output neurons was calculated by multiplying
each of its input values by its associated connection weight,
summing over all inputs, and passing the sum through the
continuous tanh(x) function to obtain the neuron’s activation value
in the range of [21; 1]. The activation value of the first output
neuron controlled the left motor speed, the second the right motor
speed, and the third whether or not the successfully pushed food
items were shared with other group members.
Relatedness, c/b Ratio, and Artificial Evolution
We used five different levels of relatedness in the experiments.
To create groups of unrelated individuals (r =0), we randomly
distributed the 1,600 individuals in the 200 groups. To obtain
groups with a relatedness of r = 1, we cloned one individual 7
times and formed groups with 8 genetically identical individuals.
To create groups with a relatedness of approximately r= 0.75, we
used two individuals (A and B) and cloned one seven times (clone
proportion A:B=1:7). The resulting relatedness in these groups
was thus r,0.7492. To create groups with a relatedness close to r =
0.5, we similarly composed each group of three types of clones but
in proportions 6:1:1, which led to r,0.5357. To create groups with
a relatedness close to r= 0.25, we again composed each group of
three types of clones, but this time using proportions 3:3:2, which
resulted in a relatedness of r,0.2468. The genetic composition of
groups thus differed from that of most animal groups in that some
individuals were clones (r=1) rather than belonging to kin classes
such as full siblings (r=0.5) or cousins (r=0.125). However, in the
absence of preferential interactions between kin, social evolution
should be influenced by the average group relatedness. This is
because genetic relatedness depends on interaction probabilities of
genes [4], which in our model is equivalent to interaction
probabilities between clonal individuals. Our experimental setup
prevented preferential interactions between individuals by ran-
domizing starting positions, having all robots being identical, and
using a neural network that did not allow individuals to memorize
past interactions.
To manipulate the c and b value of Hamilton’s rule we modified
the fitness values for shared and non-shared food items that were
successfully transported. When non-shared, a food item provided a
reward c to the selfish individual. When shared, the food item
provided no direct benefit to the focal individual but a benefit b
equally shared by the seven other robots in the group. The c/b
ratios used were calculated using Queller’s approach [42]. We
used a value of 0.01 for the smallest c/b ratio because with a value
of c/b=0, there is no selection for foraging efficiency when r=0,
hence resulting in many populations going extinct (because no
items were successfully foraged).
The foraging efficiency of each group was evaluated 10 times for
60 seconds and the inclusive fitness of each individual was
estimated according to the number of food items collected and not
shared + the number of food items that other group members
A Quantitative Test of Hamilton’s Rule
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respectively). The probability of the genome of a given robot to
contribute to the next generation was directly proportional to the
robot’s inclusive fitness (roulette wheel selection with replacement
[43]). Selected genomes were paired to conduct a crossing over
with a probability of 0.005. The resulting genomes were subjected
to mutation (probability of 0.005 per bit; i.e., 0.04 per gene). This
process of selection, recombination, and mutation was repeated
until there were enough genomes for the 1,600 individuals (200
groups) of the next generation. The level of altruism was calculated
for each group as the proportion of collected food items that was
shared within a group: A = n(a)/(n(a) + n(s)), where n(a) was the
number of collected food items individuals shared and n(s) the
number of items individuals did not share.
All 25 selection experiments were repeated 20 times (20
independent replicates). Evolution lasted for 500 generations for
each experimental condition. For statistic analyses, the fitness and
the level of altruism of all 200 groups in each of the 20 replicates
were averaged over the last 10 generations. Means were compared
with Mann-Whitney tests as Shapiro-Wilk tests showed that in
many treatments the data did not follow a normal distribution.
Calculating Relatedness, Costs, and Benefits
In each of the individually evolving populations, altruistic
interactions always occurred within groups, while the reproductive
competition occurred at the level of the population. To manipulate
the relatedness, we cloned genomes for each group and formed
groups of different proportions of clones. Each group was
composed of k different types of clones with respective frequencies
xi, i =1…k,
P
i
xi~1.
The genetic relatedness r quantifies the greater (or smaller)
genetic similarity between individuals compared to the population
average. Using the regression definition of relatedness [16,42],
r~
P
j (ql{ p p)
P
j (qj{ p p)
~
 q q{ p p
1{ p p
,
where j indexes the individuals in the population and l indexes the
social partner of j.
In our system  p p corresponds to the average probability of a focal
individual being genetically identical to another member of the
population and  q q to the average probability of a focal individual
being a genetically identical clone of another member of its group.
Assumingthatpopulationscontainmgroupswithnindividualseach,
 p p~
X
i xi
nxi{1
mn{1
 q q~
X
i xi
nxi{1
n{1
In all experiments the independently evolving populations
consisted of m=200 groups, each composed of n=8 individuals.
Given that the evolution of social behavior is influenced by the
relative rather than the absolute values of costs and benefits, we
arbitrarily set czb~1 and calculated the costs c and benefits b for
the expected transition from selfish to altruistic behavior as
b~
1
rz1
c~1{b:
Pleiotropic Effects
To test for pleiotropic effects, we studied the outcome of a single
mutation on two behavioral measures, performance and altruism.
Performance was determined as the number of food items
collected by an individual, and the level of altruism as the
percentage of these food items shared with other group members.
One mutation was performed on one individual in each of the 200
groups for each of the 20 replicates at the last generation for each
of two treatments with intermediate values of relatedness and c/b
ratio (treatment 1: r=0.25, c/b=0.75; treatment 2: r=0.75, c/b =
0.25). All 8,000 individuals were subjected to a mutation of
medium effect. This was achieved by flipping, for each individual,
the third of the eight bits of a randomly chosen gene, hence always
resulting in a mutation size 632. We chose this value because it
was the median value of the mutations (range 6128) the robots
were subjected to in the 500 generations of selection. The
performance and level of altruism of each mutated individual was
then evaluated in 100 independent trials in its group and
compared to its performance and level of altruism before the
mutation (Wilcoxon rank sum tests using a 5% significance level).
For the first treatment (r= 0.25, c/b=0.75), rank sum tests could
be conductedfor 3,961 out of the 4,000 individuals as 39 individuals
did not collect any food item either before or after the mutation,
hence preventing determination of the level of altruism. For the
second treatment (r=0.75, c/b=0.25), rank sum tests could be
conducted for 3,848 out of the 4,000 individuals, as 152 individuals
did not collect any food item either before or after the mutation.
Epistatic Effects
To test for epistatic effects, we used the same individuals as used
in the experiment on pleiotropic effects and assessed the
performances of individuals without a mutation F(0) and with a
mutation F(A). We then subjected each of these 16,000 individuals
(8,000 without and 8,000 with a mutation) to a new mutation B
(also of median effect) and assessed their fitnesses F(B) and F(AB).
We then compared whether this new mutation had a similar effect
on the fitness of individuals with and without the first mutation by
evaluating each of the resulting 32,000 individuals in 100
independent trials and calculating z scores based on the standard
deviation (SD) and mean fitness F
z~
F(AB){F(A){F(B)zF(0)
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
(SD(AB)
2zSD(A)
2zSD(B)
2zSD(0)
2)=100
q
Z scores could be calculated for 3.998 and 3,978 out of the
4,000 individuals for the first and second treatment, respectively (2
and 22 individuals, respectively, did not collect any food items).
Statistics used a 5% (z=2) significance level.
Weak Selection
Models of social evolution, as most models in evolutionary
biology, usually resort to weak selection, where different
individuals have very similar fitness. To test whether the mutations
frequently had large effects (i.e., whether there was departure from
weak selection), we determined how frequently a mutation of
median effect resulted in a greater than 25% change in
A Quantitative Test of Hamilton’s Rule
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treatment). Note that the value of 25% was arbitrarily chosen as
there is no convention of what change in fitness can be assumed to
be a departure of weak selection. Again Wilcoxon rank sum tests
were performed on the 100 trials per individual with a 5%
significance level.
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